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Abstract
Classic results in game theory state that private information is a cause for a negotiation to end with suboptimal outcome. Subse-
quently, private information is a compelling explanation for the frequent occurrence of negotiation breakdowns or costly delays. In
this paper, we propose a mechanism for improving eﬃciency of negotiation outcome for multilateral negotiations with incomplete
information (i.e., negotiators holding private information). This objective is achieved by introducing biased distribution of the
resulting surplus created by the negotiators’ joint oﬀers to prevent negotiators from misrepresenting their valuations of the nego-
tiation outcomes. Our mechanism is based on rewarding concession-making agents with larger shares of the obtainable surplus.
We show that the probabilities that the agents with private information make concession are accordingly increased. This allows for
better eﬃciency to be achieved.
c© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of KES International.
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1. Introduction
Conducted experiments have shown that more often than not negotiations reach ineﬃcient compromises1,2. In
relation to this phenomenon, a central question in research in economics and political science is to understand the
diﬃculties the parties have in reaching mutually beneﬁcial agreements. The classic result discovered by Myerson
and Satterthwaite3 indicates that uncertainty about whether the gains from trade are possible necessarily prevents
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full eﬃciency. More precisely, their result states that, given two parties with independent private valuations, ex post
eﬃciency is attainable if and only if it is common knowledge that gains from trade exist 4.1
The above-mentioned theoretical analyses are also consistent with empirical ﬁndings by Raiﬀa6 and Sebenius7,
in which they provide analyses on the negotiators failure to achieve eﬃcient agreements in practice and their unwill-
ingness to disclose private information due to strategic reasons. For this reason, private information is a compelling
explanation for the frequent occurrence of bargaining breakdowns or costly delays. Ineﬃciencies are a consequence
of the incentives to misrepresent a bargainers’ valuations between those with private information. The mechanism
proposed in this paper aims to remove such incentives by devising ways to distribute the resulting gains from trade in
such a way that the bargainer who can still make a concession becomes more willing to actually make that concession.
Most games with incomplete information, i.e., where some or all of the players have private information that is
not known to other players, are modeled using some particular information structures and strategic devices to allow
agents with private information to perform some action to send out a signal indicating their types.2 Upon observing
the action by the agent with private information, other agents can decide their own best course of actions. In various
models of the bargaining problem, several mechanisms have been used to allow negotiators to communicate their
private valuations with other parties.3 These mechanisms include the use of costly delays (i.e., time delays when there
are discount factors)8,9, transaction costs10, or bargaining deadlines11,12. Our approach, on the other hand, applies a
mechanism of biased distribution of the observable gains from trade to encourage the parties with private information
to truthfully reveal their types. To facilitate this mechanism we employ a negotiation protocol to allow the bargainers
to concurrently submit their proposals.
The paper is organised as follows. Section II gives an overview of the multilateral negotiation model, including the
negotiation protocol. In Section III, we describe the use of biased surplus division as a strategic device for negotiation
with incomplete information, focussing on the case of bilateral negotiation. Our results are extended for the case of
multilateral negotiation in the Section IV before we conclude the paper with a discussion.
2. A multilateral negotiation model
Consider the multilateral negotiation as an allocation problemwith n agents. Given the set of all possible allocations
A, agent i has a valuation vi(a, ti) for the allocation a ∈ A when its type is ti. Assume that the status quo allocation
a˜ ∈ A deﬁnes the agents’ reservation utilities. We will normalise each valuation function vi such that vi(a˜, ti) = 0.
Assume also that the maximum amount of resource available for this allocation is R. Thus, an allocation (a1, . . . , an)
is feasible iﬀ
∑n
i=1 ai ≤ R.
If the status quo allocation a˜ = (a˜1, . . . , a˜n) is feasible then, gains from trade are possible: G˜ = R−
∑n
i=1 a˜i. Because
each agent’s status quo allocation a˜i is her private information, whether or not gains from trade are possible is not
common knowledge. According to Myerson and Satterthwaite’s3 result, this source of uncertainty is the cause for
negotiation ineﬃciency. Throughout this paper, we assume that each agent’s utility is independent of the allocations
received by other agents, and that a˜i < R; otherwise, agent i would not participate in the negotiation in the ﬁrst place.
2.1. The negotiation protocol:
The negotiation protocol used in our model is similar to the Monotonic Concession Protocol13,14 which proceeds
in rounds. In each round, all agents make simultaneous allocation claims for themselves, i.e. they each claims an
allocation ai (0 ≤ ai ≤ R). The combination of all claims makes up a potential allocation a = (a1, . . . , an). If a is
a feasible allocation, i.e.
∑n
i=1 ai ≤ R, then an agreement is reached with each agent being allocated what it claims
during this round and the observable surplus σ = R −
∑n
i=1 ai will be divided between the agents.
Remark: The surplus to be distributed once an agreement is reached is the observable gains from trade based on the
agreement which could be smaller than the actual gains from trade G˜.
1 For a modern development of this result, the reader is referred to 5.
2 The “type” of a player embodies any private information that is relevant to the player’s decision making.
3 The literature of automated negotiation usually uses the agents’ reserve prices to indicate their valuations.
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Deﬁnition 1. Let a tuple Δ = (δ1, . . . , δn) be such that ∀i = 1 . . . n.δi ≥ 0 and
∑n
i=0 δi = 1. Given the agreed allocation
a = (a1, . . . , an) and the resulting surplus σ ≥ 0, the Δ-surplus division provides agent i the allocation ai + δiσ.
The negotiation protocol can now be described as follows:
(1) In the ﬁrst round, each agent i makes an initial claim a0i ;
(2) In each subsequent round t > 0, an agent i either makes a concession ati < a
t−1
i , or stays with its previous claim
ati = a
t−1
i ;
(3) Step (2) is iterated until either an agreement is reached or a conﬂict situation arises in which no agent makes a
concession. When a conﬂict situation concludes the negotiation, all agents leave the negotiation with the status
quo allocation a˜.
It’s straightforward to see that the above negotiation protocol terminates after a ﬁnite number of rounds.
2.2. Example (the seller-buyer bargaining problem)
This is a classic problem considered by game theorists, usually known as the bargaining problem15. In this prob-
lem, a seller of an indivisible good, agent 1, faces a potential buyer, agent 2. A successful bargain is concluded if
and only if the good is transferred at a mutually acceptable price P. That is, let (i) v1 denotes the seller’s reservation
price–the smallest monetary sum he will accept in exchange for the good; and (ii) v2 denotes the buyer’s reservation
price–the greatest sum she is willing to pay for the good, the sale price P must satisfy v1 ≤ P ≤ v2, if such an interval
exists.
The above problem can be rendered within our negotiation model as follows. During the negotiation, the seller
and the buyer simultaneously make oﬀers p1 ≥ v1 and p2 ≤ v2, respectively. If no concession has been made in
comparison to the previous round, negotiation is terminated in a conﬂict situation. If p1 ≤ p2, an agreement is reached
with the surplus σ = p2 − p1 to be split between the agents. Under a surplus division scheme Δ = (δ1, δ2), the ﬁnal
allocation is (p1 + δ1σ,−p2 + δ2σ) and the sale price P = p1 + δ1σ.
Lemma 1. When δ1+δ2 = 1, the reformulated negotiation problem corresponds exactly to the seller-buyer bargaining
problem.
Proof: The price the buyer has to pay, according to the above description, is p2 − δ2σ. We will show that (i) P =
p2 − δ2σ, and (ii) v1 ≤ P ≤ v2.
(i) P = p1 + δ1σ = p1 + (1 − δ2)(p2 − p1) = p2 − δ2(p2 − p1) = p2 − δ2σ.
(ii) P = p1 + δ1σ ≥ p1 ≥ v1, and P = p2 − δ2σ ≤ p2 ≤ v2.
3. Surplus division as a strategic device
Research from various disciplines as well as experimental and empirical studies has shown that cooperation is the
key to achieving optimality in most interactions between a group of individuals, particularly in negotiations6,16,17,18.
However, given the competitive nature of negotiation, not all negotiators behave cooperatively. The main purpose of
our approach is to devise mechanisms that encourage the negotiators to behave cooperatively rather than competitively.
We implement this via a mechanism of biased distribution of the observable surplus.
3.1. The bilateral bargaining problem
Consider a bargaining between a buyer and a seller of an indivisible good. Each agent has two possible valuations
high (h) and low (l) of the good that deﬁnes her types:
Valuation
Type Seller Buyer
weak al1 a
h
2
strong ah1 a
l
2
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where al1 ≤ a
l
2 < a
h
1 ≤ a
h
2.
Notice that gains from trade are possible unless both agents are of type strong. That is, when the buyer has a low
valuation of the item al2 while the seller values the item high a
h
1 and because a
l
2 < a
h
1, mutually beneﬁcial trade is not
possible. We let π1 (resp. π2) denote the initial probability that the seller (resp. the buyer) of unknown type is strong.
These probabilities are exogenously given, and are common knowledge.
Note that the above bargaining problem has the same information setting as the problem considered by Chatterjee and
Samuelson19. Chatterjee and Samuelson establish a (unique) Nash equilibrium for their negotiation setting by using
time as a strategic variable and imposing costly delays during negotiation. While the use of impatience, via costly
delays, as the strategic information device has been a common practice in the literature of bargaining, this is certainly
not applicable in every negotiation. Some researchers even claim that in some negotiations some parties may prefer a
later agreement to an early one20. Also, a necessary consequence of costly delays is that they prevent full eﬃciency.
Our proposed approach employs biased distribution of the resulting surplus which is costless, and thus, improve the
eﬃciency of the negotiation and allow full eﬃciency to be achieved under certain conditions.
In this problem setting, an agent i ∈ {1, 2} can either “play tough” (denoted by the action PT ) by claiming that she
is of type strong, or “play soft” (denoted by the action PS ) by stating that she is of type weak. Since a strong-type
agent has only one strategy of playing tough all the way, most of the analysis below will be on the weak-type agents.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the default surplus division scheme Δd distributes the surplus equally
among the agents, i.e., δdi =
1
n where n is the number of negotiators. This assumption does not aﬀect the results of this
paper.
To motivate our approach, we’ll consider a simple bargaining example.
Example 1. Consider a buyer B and a seller S who negotiate over the price of an item. Assume that it’s common
knowledge that S ’s cost for the item can be either $50 or $53 with equal probability 0.5, and it’s common knowledge
that the item is available for anyone at the price $55 but B might know someone who is willing to sell him the same
item for $52. It’s common knowledge that B knows the other person with probability 0.5.
Under the default surplus division which awards half of the obtainable surplus to each of the agents, this bargaining
has a Nash equilibrium. In the ﬁrst round of the negotiation, both agents play tough with probability 1, regardless of
their types. In the second round, while a strong-type agent continues to play PT , a weak-type agent will play PT with
probability 0.2 and play PS with probability 0.8. This equilibrium gives the weak-type agents an expected utility of
1.6. Note that, as the weak-type agents do not play PS with probability 1, full eﬃciency is not achieved.
On the other hand, consider a biased surplus division scheme in which the agent who makes a concession in the
second round of the negotiation will be rewarded by getting more than half of the obtainable surplus. In particular,
by giving the agent who makes a concession in the second round of the negotiation 62.5% of the surplus, we could
get the equilibrium strategy of the weak-type agent to play soft (PS ) with probability 1 in the second round. In other
words, through biased surplus division, the full eﬃciency of the negotiation in this example can be achieved.
We now provide a number of formal results for the simple bargaining problem described at the beginning of this
section. We ﬁrst introduce the some notations:
• The default surplus division, denoted by Δd, is applicable when the two agents make the same number of
concessions. When the seller, agent 1, makes one concession more than the buyer, the surplus division is
(δ′1, 1 − δ
′
1) and when the buyer makes one concession more than the seller, the surplus division is (1 − δ
′
2, δ
′
2).
• σ1 = al2 − a
l
1 is the surplus obtainable when the seller plays soft (PS ) and the buyer plays tough (PT ).
• σ2 = ah2 − a
h
1 is the surplus obtainable when the seller plays tough (PT ) and the buyer plays soft (PS ).
• σ3 = ah2 − a
l
2 is the surplus obtainable when both agents play PS .
• γ = ah1 − a
l
2 is the gap between the valuations of the strong-type agents. Note that, because of the assumption
that al2 < a
h
1, γ > 0.
The following theorem introduces the main result of the paper. The ﬁrst part states that by increasing the share of
the observable surplus for the concession making agents, we increase the chance that, in equilibrium, the weak-type
agents will play soft in the second stage of the negotiation, and thus improve the eﬃciency of the negotiation outcome.
Note that it suﬃces to state the result for the buyer (i.e. agent 2) since the same result and analysis apply to agent 1.
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Theorem 1. (i) By increasing the surplus share to the concession-making agent (i.e., δ′1 and δ
′
2), the probability of
a weak-type agent playing PS in the second stage is increased.
(ii) Agent 2 plays PS with probability 1 in the second stage if
σ1 + γ − δ
d
1σ3 + (1 − δ
′
1)σ2
σ1 + γ − δ
d
1σ3 + (1 − δ
′
1)σ2 + δ
′
1σ1
≤ π2.
Proof: (i) We use backward induction analysis to obtain the equilibrium strategies for the weak-type agents. (Note
that the strong-type agents have only one possible strategy of playing PT .) In the following, we denote by θi the
action θ taken by agent i. For instance, PS 1 is the action PS taken by the agent 1.
In the second stage, agent 1’s expected payoﬀ, denoted by E(2)1 , is: E
(2)
1 = P
(2)
t E
(2)
1 [PT1]+ (1−P
(2)
t )E
(2)
1 [PS 1], where
P(2)t is the probability that agent 1 plays PT in the second stage, and E
(2)
1 [PT1] (resp. E
(2)
1 [PS 1]) denotes the expected
utility of agent 1 when playing PT (resp. PS ) in the second stage.
Agent 1’s expected payoﬀwhen playing PT in the second stage is: E(2)1 [PT1] = α
(2)E(2)1 [PT1|PT2]+(1−α
(2))E(2)1 [PT1|PS 2],
where α(2) is the probability that agent 2 of unknown type plays PT in the second stage. Thus, E(2)1 [PT1] =
(1 − α(2))(σ1 + γ + (1 − δ′1)σ2), since E
(2)
1 [PT1|PT2] = 0.
Similarly, agent 1’s expected payoﬀ when playing PS in the second stage is: E(2)1 [PS 1] = α
(2)δ′1σ1+ (1−α
(2))δd1σ3.
In equilibrium, the buyer’s strategy must be such that E(2)1 [PT1] = E
(2)
1 [PS 1]. That is, (1−α
(2))(σ1+γ+(1−δ′1)σ2) =
α(2)δ′1σ1 + (1 − α
(2))δd1σ3. In other words, in equilibrium, the buyer is expected to play PT with the probability
α(2) =
σ1 + γ − δ
d
1σ3 + (1 − δ
′
1)σ2
σ1 + γ − δ
d
1σ3 + (1 − δ
′
1)σ2 + δ
′
1σ1
. Note that, if α(2) ≤ π2, the buyer of unknown type is expected to play
tough with the probability of at least π2, making playing PS the dominant strategy for the weak-type seller, since
E(2)1 [PT1] ≤ E
(2)
1 [PS 1].
Thus, unless α(2) ≤ π2, the buyer is expected to play PS with the probability
1 − α(2) =
δ′1σ1
σ1 + γ − δ
d
1σ3 + (1 − δ
′
1)σ2 + δ
′
1σ1
(1)
Thus,
1 − α(2) =
δ′1σ1
σ1 + γ − δ
d
1σ3 + σ2 + δ
′
1(σ1 − σ2)
.
When λ > 1,
δ′1σ1
σ1 + γ − δ
d
1σ3 + σ2 + δ
′
1(σ1 − σ2)
<
λδ′1σ1
σ1 + γ − δ
d
1σ3 + σ2 + λδ
′
1(σ1 − σ2)
.
Therefore, by increasing δ′1, the probability that agent 2 plays PS in the second stage increases.
Similarly, we can prove that, by increasing δ′2, the probability that agent 1 plays PS in the second stage increases.
(ii) This is a corollary of statement (i) (see the paragraph preceding Equation (1) for the case of agent 2). 
Proposition 1. When δ′1 ≥ δ
d
1 (resp. δ
′
2 ≥ δ
d
2), playing PT is the equilibrium strategy of agent 1 (resp. agent 2) in the
ﬁrst stage.
Proof: Again, PT is the only feasible strategy for the strong-type agent. Thus, we’ll consider only the strategy
of the weak-type agent 1. For the weak-type agent 1, the expected payoﬀ when playing PT (in the ﬁrst stage) is:
E(1)1 [PT1] = α
(1)E(1)1 [PT1|PT2] + (1 − α
(1))E(1)1 [PT1|PS 2], where α
(1) is the probability that agent 2 of unknown type
plays PT in the ﬁrst stage. Thus, E(1)1 [PT1] = α
(1)E(2)1 + (1 − α
(1))(σ1 + γ + δd1σ2). On the other hand, E
(1)
1 [PS 1] =
α(1)δd1σ1 + (1 − α
(1))δd1σ3.
Note that, either E(2)1 [PS 1] ≥ E
(2)
1 [PT1] (in which playing PS is the dominant strategy in the second stage for
weak-type agent 1), or E(2)1 [PS 1] = E
(2)
1 [PT1]. Thus, E
(2)
1 = E
(2)
1 [PS 1]. We will show that E
(1)
1 [PT1] − E
(1)
1 [PS 1] ≥ 0.
Or, α(1)(E(2)1 − δ
d
1 ∗ σ1) + (1 − α
(1))(σ1 + γ + δd1σ2 − δ
d
1σ3) ≥ 0.
For that purpose, we’ll show that
E(2)1 − δ
d
1σ1 ≥ 0 (2)
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and
σ1 + γ + δ
d
1σ2 − δ
d
1σ3 ≥ 0 (3)
To prove (2):
E(2)1 −δ
d
1σ1 = α
(2)δ′1σ1+ (1−α
(2))δd1σ3−δ
d
1σ1 ≥ α
(2)δd1σ1+ (1−α
(2))δd1σ3−δ
d
1σ1 = δ
d
1(σ3−σ1)+α
(2)δd1(σ1−σ3) =
δd1(σ3 − σ1)(1 − α
(2)) ≥ 0.
To prove (3):
σ1 + γ + δ
d
1σ2 − δ
d
1σ3 = σ1 + γ + δ
d
1σ2 − δ
d
1(σ1 + γ + σ2) = (σ1 + γ)(1 − δ
d
1) ≥ 0. 
Note that the above theorem and proposition also show that, by decreasing the surplus share to the concession-
making agent (i.e., δ′1 and δ
′
2), the probability of a weak-type agent playing PT in the second stage is increased.
Subsequently, a weak-type agent who has decided to play PT in the ﬁrst stage will have a smaller expected payoﬀ
in the second stage (in comparison to the expected payoﬀ under the default surplus division scheme Δd). As a
consequence, as δ′1 (resp. δ
′
2) continues to decrease, the weak-type agent’s probability of playing PT in the ﬁrst stage
will decrease.
Therefore, it’s worthwhile asking whether full eﬃciency (i.e., extracting the entire possible gains from trade) can
be achieved by making δ′1 and δ
′
2 suﬃciently small. The following theorem states that, in general, that is not possible.
Theorem 2. When δ′1 < δ
d
1 and δ
′
2 < δ
d
2, full eﬃciency is attainable if and only if π2σ1 ≥ (1 − π2)(σ1 + γ) and
π1σ2 ≥ (1 − π1)(σ2 + γ).
Proof: The notations used in the proof will be the same as those used in the proof of Theorem 1. Note that full
eﬃciency is attainable if and only if both weak-type agents play PS in the ﬁrst stage or both play soft in the second
stage. By decreasing δ′1 and δ
′
2, the probabilities that the weak-type agents play PT increase, making full eﬃciency
being attainable if and only if both weak-type agents play PS in the ﬁrst stage. That is, E(1)1 [PS 1] ≥ E
(1)
1 [PT1] and
E(1)2 [PS 2] ≥ E
(1)
2 [PT2].
To elaborate the ﬁrst inequality:
α(1)δd1σ1 + (1 − α
(1))δd1σ3 ≥ α
(1)E(2)1 + (1 − α
(1))(σ1 + γ + δd1σ2)
The tight condition is obtainable when E(1)1 [PT1] is smallest, making E
(2)
1 = 0 (which is the case when both agents
play tough in the second stage). Moreover, full eﬃciency is attainable if and only if the weak-type agent 2 plays PS
in the ﬁrst stage, i.e., α(1) = π2. Thus, the above equation can be rewritten as: π2σ1 ≥ (1 − π2)(σ1 + γ). 
In particular, in Example 1, the above condition only holds when π2 ≥
σ1 + γ
2σ1 + γ
. Thus, for π2 = 0.5 and γ =
1, σ1 = 2, given nonnegative δ′1 and δ
′
2, it’s impossible to attain full eﬃciency.
3.2. Bilateral bargaining between agents with more than two types
When each agent has more than two types, the negotiation can proceed in more than two stages. Subsequently,
the analysis will become more complex. Nevertheless, one generalisation we can make from the preceding section is
that, assuming that the default surplus division Δd splits the surplus equally among the agents, i.e., ∀i, j.δdi = δ
d
j , all
agents will attempt to make the maximal claim of allocation in their initial proposal. The rationale behind this is that,
by making the maximal allocation claim in its initial proposal, an agent does not risk a negotiation breakdown and it
also avoids its private information from being disclosed to other agents. Thus, unless the biased surplus division is
so extreme that it makes going into the later stages of the negotiation unattractive, “playing tough” is the dominant
strategy for all agents during the ﬁrst stage of the negotiation.
As the negotiation proceeds to the subsequent rounds, at least one agent must concede in each round to avoid
negotiation breakdown. Thus, the number of the agents’ types will be monotonically decreased, allowing us to carry
out backward induction analysis based on the results presented in the preceding section. We’ll carry out the formal
analysis for the case of each agent having three diﬀerent types h, m, and l. We will only consider the non-trivial case
in which: al1 ≤ a
l
2 ≤ a
m
1 < a
m
2 ≤ a
h
1 ≤ a
h
1. Note that any other conﬁguration degenerates to the cases of agents having
two types or less. A negotiation that satisﬁes this condition proceeds in at most three rounds as follows.
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Assuming that the default surplus division Δd splits the surplus equally between the agents, in a Nash equilibrium
each agent i will make an initial proposal claiming the maximal allocation ah1 (resp. a
l
2) for itself in the ﬁrst stage of
the negotiation. As the negotiation proceeds to the second round, several possible scenarios could realise:
1. Both agents make no concession, and the negotiation ends in a conﬂict;
2. Both agents make concessions, and the negotiation ends with the allocation (am1 , a
m
2 ) and the surplus a
m
2 − a
m
1
which will be split using the default surplus division Δd;
3. One agent makes a concession while the other holds ﬁrm.
The last scenario will be the only one in which the negotiation will proceed to another stage. Without loss of
generality, we can assume that the agent 2 makes a concession whilst agent 1 holds ﬁrm to his previous proposal. As
it turns out, the agents are now playing this last stage of the negotiation with an information setting identical to the
information setting in the second stage of the negotiation considered in the preceding section. That is, each agent has
two types and only one agent needs to concede to reach an agreement, although if both agents concede then they will
obtain the biggest surplus.
The reason for the reduction of the information structure of the game is that, by making a concession, the buyer b
makes it common knowledge that al2 is not her type. Subsequently, it’s common knowledge that her type can only be
either ah2 or a
m
2 with the probability of each type updated according to Bayes’ theorem. Furthermore, as agent 2’s type
is either ah2 or a
m
2 , it becomes common knowledge that the seller (i.e., agent 1) will never settle for the allocation a
l
1,
making al1 no longer his type. More precisely, the probability that agent 1 is of type a
l
1 becomes 0 while the probability
that agent 1 is of type am1 and a
h
1 are updated according to Bayes’ theorem.
Given this information structure, the entire game-theoretic analysis for the second stage in the preceding section,
in particular Theorem 1, applies. That is, by increasing the rewards to the concession-making agents, we eﬀectively
increase the agents’ probabilities of making concession. Note also that, the type-ah2 buyer and the type-a
l
1 seller may
need to make more than one concession. Therefore, to encourage an agent to make further concession, we also need
to provide further incentive. That is, a surplus division scheme will now make up of two values for each agent: δ′,11
(resp. δ′,21 ) denotes the surplus share that agent 1 receives when she makes one concession (resp. two concessions)
more than the number of concessions made by the agent 2. And likewise for δ′,12 and δ
′,2
2 .
Theorem 3. When δ′, j1 and δ
′, j
2 ( j = 1, 2) are increased, the probability that the type-a
l
1 and the type-a
m
1 and the
type-ah2 and the type-a
m
2 agents makes concession also increases.
Proof: (sketch) We will follow the notations used in the proof of Theorem 1, with the addition of the additional
strategy of “playing medium” (PM) for both agents 1 and 2. That is, a type-al1 and a type-a
h
2 agent can play either
PT (making no concession), or PM (making one concession), or PS (making two concessions). On the other hand, a
type-ami agent can only play either PT or PM. And a type-a
h
1 and a type-a
l
2 agent can only play PT .
Using backward induction analysis, it’s easy to see that when the negotiation moves into the third stage, one of the
agents played PT in the second stage and the other agent played PM in the second stage. Without loss of generality,
we assume that agent 2 played PT2 and agent 1 played PM1 in the second stage. Subsequently, it becomes common
knowledge that agent 1 can not be of type ah1. Furthermore, there are only two feasible types remaining for agent 2:
am2 and a
l
2. Applying Theorem 1, by increasing δ
′s,2
1 and δ
′,1
2 the probabilities that the type-a
l
1 seller and the type-a
l
2
buyer make concession also increases.
We now analyse the strategies of the players in the second stage. Note that when one of the agents makes a
concession in the ﬁrst stage, the analysis in the preceding paragraph applies for the second stage. Thus, our analysis
will be focused on the non-trivial case of both agents playing PT in the ﬁrst stage. We will provide the detailed
analysis for the case of the seller of type al1 because the case of the seller of type a
m
1 is similar and much simpler.
When the seller (i.e., agent 1) is of type al1 and the probabilities that agent 2 of unknown type plays PTb and PMb
in the second stage are φ(2) and ψ(2), respectively, agent 1’s expected payoﬀs when playing diﬀerent strategies in the
second stage are:
E(2)1 [PT1] = φ
(2)E(2)1 [PT1|PT2] + ψ
(2)E(2)1 [PT1|PM2] + (1 − φ
(2) − ψ(2))E(2)1 [PT1|PS 2].
E(2)1 [PM1] = φ
(2)E(2)1 [PM1|PT2] + ψ
(2)E(2)1 [PM1|PM2] + (1 − φ
(2) − ψ(2))E(2)1 [PM1|PS 2].
E(2)1 [PS 1] = φ
(2)E(2)1 [PS 1|PT2] + ψ
(2)E(2)1 [PS 1|PM2] + (1 − φ
(2) − ψ(2))E(2)1 [PS 1|PS 2].
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Note also that, E(2)1 [PT1|PT2] = 0.
Let Θ1 = E(2)1 [PM1] − E
(2)
1 [PS 1], and Θ2 = E
(2)
1 [PM1] − E
(2)
1 [PT1]. Observe that, under the default surplus
division Δd that gives the agents equal shares of the surplus, playing PM dominates the strategy of playing PS , i.e.,
E(2)1 [PM1] ≥ E
(2)
1 [PS 1]:
i. E(2)1 [PM1|PM2] = (a
m
1 − a
l
1) + δ
d
1(a
m
2 − a
m
1 ) ≥ δ
d
1(a
m
1 − a
l
1 + a
m
2 − a
m
1 ) = δ
d
1(a
m
1 − a
l
1) = E
(2)
1 [PS 1|PM2], and
ii. E(2)1 [PM1|PS 2] = (a
m
1 − a
l
1) + δ
d
1(a
h
2 − a
m
1 ) ≥ δ
d
1(a
m
1 − a
l
1 + a
h
2 − a
m
1 ) = δ
d
1 ∗ (a
h
2 − a
l
1) = E
(2)
1 [PS 1|PS 2].
iii. Finally, it’s also obvious that E(2)1 [PM1|PT2] ≥ E
(2)
1 [PS 1|PT2] since, in the worst case, the type-a
l
1 seller can
choose to play PS 1 with probability 1 in the third stage and obtain the same expected payoﬀ as E(2)1 [PS 1|PT2].
That is, under Δd, Θ1 ≥ 0. We rewrite Θ1 = φ(2)Θ11 + ψ
(2)Θ21 + (1 − φ
(2) − ψ(2))Θ31, where Θ
1
1 = E
(2)
1 [PM1|PT2] −
E(2)1 [PS 1|PT2], and Θ
2
1 = E
(2)
1 [PM1|PM2] − E
(2)
1 [PS 1|PM2], and Θ
3
1 = E
(2)
1 [PM1|PS 2] − E
(2)
1 [PS 1|PS 2].
When δ′,11 and δ
′,2
1 are increased, Θ
1
1 will either decrease or be unchanged, Θ
2
1 will decrease, and Θ
3
1 will decrease.
Subsequently, as δ′,11 and δ
′,2
1 are increased, Θ1. Thus, when δ
′,1
1 and δ
′,2
1 are suﬃciently large, agent 1 will start playing
PS 1 with positive probabilities. Moreover, the larger δ′,11 and δ
′,2
1 are, the higher the probability that agent 1 will play
PS 1. Because of the symmetry between agent 1 and agent 2, we obtain the same result for the type-ah2 agent.
We will now prove the theorem for the case of Θ2. In equilibrium, agent 2’s strategy (φ(2), ψ(2)) will be such that
Θ2 = 0. We denote Θ2 = φ(2)Θ12+ψ
(2)Θ22+ (1−φ
(2)−ψ(2))Θ32, where Θ
1
2 = E
(2)
1 [PM1|PT2], and Θ
2
2 = E
(2)
1 [PM1|PM2]−
E(2)1 [PT1|PM2], and Θ
3
2 = E
(2)
1 [PM1|PS 2] − E
(2)
1 [PT1|PS 2].
When δ′,11 and δ
′,2
1 are increased, Θ
1
2 will increase, Θ
2
2 will increase or be unchanged, and Θ
3
2 will decrease.
Subsequently, as δ′,11 and δ
′,2
1 are increased, to maintain the equilibrium condition Θ2 = 0, it’s necessary that φ
(2)
decreases and (1 − φ(2) − ψ(2)) increases. In other words, the probability that agent 2 makes concession is increased.
4. Multilateral negotiation
We will now generalise the results in the previous section to the multilateral negotiations where the number of
negotiating agents n > 2. One important feature of our proposed negotiation model is worth emphasizing. Essentially,
each negotiator is only concerned about making the resource claim for himself, without having to propose what the
other agents should get. This is the major deviation from the traditional monotonic concession protocol introduced
by Rosenschein and Zlotkin13. This eﬀectively allows a negotiator to treat other parties collectively as a single
opponent.
Our formal analysis will be carried out in a simple negotiation setting with three negotiators, denoted by 1, 2, 3,
who have two types each, denoted by awi and a
s
i for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Due to the symmetry between the agents, we will only
consider the eﬀects of biased surplus division on agent 1’s strategies. The possible allocations for agent 1’s opponents
consist of (aw2 , a
w
3 ), (a
w
2 , a
s
3), (a
s
2, a
w
3 ), and (a
s
2, a
s
3). Without loss of generality, we will assume that a
w
2 + a
s
3 ≤ a
s
2 + a
w
3 .
When x + y ≤ x′ + y′ we will write (x, y) 	 (x′, y′). Thus, we have (aw2 , a
w
3 ) ≺ (a
w
2 , a
s
3) 	 (a
s
2, a
w
3 ) ≺ (a
s
2, a
s
3).
We will only consider the non-trivial case in which: (a) the allocations (aw1 , a
w
2 , a
w
3 ) and (a
s
1, a
w
2 , a
w
3 ) are feasible;
otherwise agent 1 has only one strategy of claiming aw1 in the ﬁrst stage of the negotiation if it’s possible for him to do
so, and (b) the allocation (as1, a
s
2, a
s
3) is infeasible, otherwise all agents will claim their respective maximal allocations
regardless of their types. Then, the agent 1 who is trying to reach an agreement with agents 2 and 3 can formulate his
problem as a bilateral negotiation between himself and another agent −1 whose types a1
−1, a
2
−1, a
3
−1, and a
4
−1 correspond
to the allocations (aw2 , a
w
3 ), (a
w
1 , a
s
3), (a
s
2, a
w
3 ), and (a
s
2, a
s
3), respectively. Furthermore, when the allocation (a
w
1 , a
s
2, a
w
3 ) is
not feasible, there are two cases: (i) the allocation (as1, a
w
2 , a
s
3) is feasible, then agents 1 and 3 will claim their respective
maximal allocations regardless of their types and the type-aw2 agent has only one strategy of claiming a
w
2 ; and (ii) when
the allocation (as1, a
w
2 , a
s
3) is infeasible then the problem reduces to the bilateral negotiation setting discussed in the
preceding section. Also, when (aw1 , a
s
2, a
w
3 ) is not feasible, the allocation (a
w
1 , a
w
2 , a
s
3) is also not feasible and this
problem setting is reduced to the above case.
The formal analysis of the non-trivial problem settings necessarily involves at least four allocations: (aw1 , a
w
2 , a
w
3 ),
(aw1 , a
w
2 , a
s
3), (a
w
1 , a
s
2, a
w
3 ), and (a
s
1, a
w
2 , a
w
3 ), and should have at most seven allocations (i.e., all possible allocations
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with the exception of (as1, a
s
2, a
s
3)). The negotiation goes through at most three stages when the number of feasible
allocations is not more than six.4
Using similar backward induction analyses to those employed to prove Theorems 1 and 3, we can establish the
following theorems:
Theorem 4. (i) Given a default surplus division Δd that splits the surplus equally among the agents 1, 2, 3, “play-
ing tough” by claiming the maximal allocation as1 for himself is agent 1’s dominant strategy in the ﬁrst stage of
the negotiation.
(ii) When the surpluses are positive, by giving the agents who make concession in a later stage of the negotiation
increased shares of the surplus, the probability that the agent 1 makes a concession in a later stage of the
negotiation increases.
Proof:
1. Assume by way of contradiction that in equilibrium, agent ı plays PT (i.e., claims the maximal allocation a2ı )
with a probability that is less than 1 in the ﬁrst stage. Let σ∗ = (σ∗ı , σ∗j , σ∗) denote the equilibrium strategy proﬁle.
Thus, σ∗,(1)ı (PT ) < 1. We’ll show that the is a strategy proﬁle σ such that Eı[σ] ≥ Eı[σ∗]. We’ll construct σ as
follows: (i) σ−ı = σ∗−ı; and (ii) σ
(t)
ı = σ
∗,(t)
ı , for t > 1; and (iii) σ∗,(1)ı (PT ) = 1.
Again, we consider the agent ı whose type is a1ı , for the type-a2ı agent has only one strategy of playing PT with
probability 1. Note that σ and σ∗ are only diﬀerent in the strategy of agent ı in the ﬁrst stage of the negotiation. That
is, the only possible diﬀerence in agent ı’s payoﬀ is when an agreement is reached in the ﬁrst stage due to agent ı’s
playing PS with a positive probability.
If an agreement would be reached in the ﬁrst stage regardless of whether agent ı plays PT or PS then Eı[σ] −
Eı[σ∗] = 23 ∗ (a
2
ı − a1ı ) ≥ 0.
If an agreement can only be reached when the type-a1ı agent plays PS and not when she plays PT then the agree-
ment attainable by playing PS in the ﬁrst stage will also be attainable in a later stage if the agent had played PT in the
ﬁrst stage. This is because an agent can only either stay with her previous claim or make a concession in subsequent
stages. Thus, for σ(2)ı to be consistent with σ
∗,(2)
ı , reachable agreements due to the agent ı playing PS in the ﬁrst stage
has to be reached in a later stage. Moreover, because other agents also can only stay with her previous claim or make
a concession, the resulting surplus will be at least as large as the surplus obtained in the agreement reached in the ﬁrst
stage. Therefore, Eı[σ] ≥ Eı[σ∗]. It’s straightforward to show the existence of cases when Eı[σ] > Eı[σ∗]. Hence,
σ∗ is not an equilibrium strategy proﬁle of this game. Contradiction.
2. The proof of this proposition is similar to that of Theorem 3. We’ll consider Δ(t) = E(t)ı [PS ] − E(t)ı [PT ], where
t > 1. We can then prove by case that, if agent ı’s equilibrium strategy under the default surplus division Kd assigns
a positive probability for the action PT then under a biased surplus division that rewards concession making the
probability of playing PT decreases. The proof is based on the induction assumption for the two-agent case as proved
in Theorem 3. 
5. Discussion and future work
Bargaining with private information has been a topic of much interest for many years (see e.g., 5). It has been
established that uncertainty about whether the gains from trade in a negotiation are possible necessarily prevents
full eﬃciency, resulting in negotiation breakdowns (e.g., 1,2) or costly delays (e.g., 19,8). In particular, Chatterjee and
Samuelson19 establish a sequential equilibrium for the bilateral negotiation, albeit full eﬃciency is not achieved due
to costly delays. In our proposed approach, we introduce a mechanism to allow eﬃciency of the negotiation to be
improved without having to use costly signal devices. That is, our mechanism is costless.
One important advantage of our proposed mechanism and negotiation protocol allows us to easily deal with multi-
lateral negotiations. This is because, unlike existing approaches to the bargaining problem, the proposed negotiation
protocol doesn’t require a negotiator to propose what the other agents should get in her oﬀer, she only needs to stake
4 When there are seven feasible allocations, only one agent needs to make a concession for an agreement to be reached. Thus the negotiation will
not have more than two stages.
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her claim on what she should at least get from an agreement. The pressure on the agents to make concession and
reach agreement is generated from the risk of negotiation breakdown. Furthermore, upon a feasible agreed allocation
based on the agents’ claims, the resulting surplus can then be distributed in such a way that the agents who make
concession during the negotiation are rewarded with larger shares of the surplus. We then showed that, under such a
surplus division scheme, the probability that agents make concession during later stages of the negotiation accordingly
increases. Moreover, the condition for full eﬃciency for the special problem setting of bilateral negotiations with each
agent having two types was also established.
Nonetheless, when the negotiation is over issues with continuous values in which agents can make as small a
concession as they wish, e.g., negotiating over the price of an item where any price within an interval of real numbers
would be possible, there is a way for the negotiators to neutralise the surplus division schemes proposed in this paper.
That is, a manipulative agent could avoid the eﬀects of biased surplus division by making many small concessions.
This way, the manipulative agent avoids being punished by the biased surplus division because when the agreement is
reached the observable surplus is so small that any share of this surplus would not signiﬁcantly aﬀect her utility. (Note
that the size of the observable surplus is signiﬁcant for the surplus division mechanism to be eﬀective.) To overcome
this issue, we are currently investigating a mechanism to impose concession taxes on agents’ concessions.
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